I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the People's Republic of China's (PRC) premier Deng Xiao Ping launched the country's efforts to open its doors to the world. Since the changes that he envisioned were drastic, he initiated a policy in which key strategic cities would be chosen as experimental zones with privileged status. The special economic zones (SEZs) and closely related free trade zones (FTZs) were spectacularly successful and attracted foreign direct investment (FDI), as ll as an agglomeration of domestic firms hoping to do business with multinational corporations. While the strategies used to attract investment were extremely successful, little is known as to the success of the policy's intention of foreign investment inducing productivity improvement in domestic PRC firms. It is even less clear whether foreign investment has translated into wage increases for Chinese workers, especially those with low skill levels.
Has the PRC's phenomenal growth created a tide that "lifted all ships"? Many fear that corporate profits have captured the bulk of the surplus generated by lower costs of production in the PRC, leaving labor with a smaller share of an albeit larger pie. If wage increases for workers are modest, rising average price levels may leave many workers worse off as a result of trade, in terms of purchasing power. Examining the PRC experience in these tax-privileged zones is important for evaluating the potential of globalization to reduce poverty in developing countries, as the PRC experience has been hailed as a model. It has been used to encourage other countries to pursue similar development strategies, although in some countries such as India, local groups have blocked the implementation of SEZs due to concern about their impact on the local economy. Thus, an accurate assessment of the economic impact of these policies on such factors as employment, wages, and income inequality is of significance both in the PRC and in developing countries around the world.
This study exploits the phased rollout of the PRC's SEZs, and closely related FTZs 1 , to assess the impact of multinational activity on local labor markets, and the welfare of workers in these cities. A key challenge in the analysis is that these areas were chosen endogenously, as the majority of these areas were in coastal areas that may have benefited from the PRC's growth in the absence of special treatment. The study exploits a quasi-experiment associated with Deng Xiao Ping's famous "southern tour" in 1992. His visit and policy statements in favor of economic liberalization provided political impetus for expanding the number of cities with special status, and increasing autonomy within the existing SEZs.
This paper examines a panel of PRC cities-its firms, workers, and whether the cities are tax-privileged each year. The sample period for firms and for workers (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) was characterized by large increases in FDI to the PRC, with much of the increase occurring in the SEZs. Since the timing of the establishment of the zones varied across cities, it is possible to estimate models that exploit variation within a city in terms of FDI and other outcomes of interest such as labor productivity (proxied by valued added per worker) and average wage levels. Importantly, the paper also examines whether existence of higher productivity firms leads to higher real wages for the average worker, for only the highest earning worker, or if the extra productivity is completely captured by an increasing return to capital.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the background of how SEZs and FTZs were established, and the special treatment they provided to multinational firms. Section III presents data on firms, workers, and the rollout of special-status zones in the PRC. Section IV presents the estimation strategy and 1 As will be discussed, there are several other special zones similar to SEZs and FTZs included in the analysis. Specifically, export processing zones (EPZ) and coastal open cities (COC) are included in the analysis. An area is generally referred to as a "special economic zone" when it has any of these four designations (SEZ, FTZ, EPZ, or COC) . Section V the empirical results. Section VI concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the findings.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The PRC's Special Economic Zones
The SEZ experiment began soon after Deng Xiaoping's 1978 policy statement in which he argued for greater economic liberalization, and more interaction with firms from overseas (Yeung et al. 2009 ). These zones were envisioned as small laboratories to explore the economic potential of further opening up of the PRC's economy, and so four southern cities were chosen for SEZ status, in which they were able to operate with administrative autonomy from the provincial government, and foreign firms were allowed tax exemptions. The SEZs were strategically located in coastal areas close to islands with capitalist economies, including Xiamen (near Taipei,China); Zhuhai (near Macao, China); and the most successful SEZ, Shenzhen, which capitalized on its proximity to Hong Kong, China. While the areas chosen were in locations convenient to foreign firms, they were by no means already developed areas. In fact, the government focused on undeveloped cities to minimize resistance to the new policies, and to limit damage should the experiment fail. For example, prior to obtaining SEZ status in 1980, Shenzhen was a small fishing village without even a single traffic light (CCPR, 1987) . Twenty years later, its population had exceeded 10 million. The SEZs were successful at attracting foreign investment and cheap migrant labor from nearby provinces almost immediately (Yeung 2009) . By 1985, the SEZs accounted for more than 20% of the PRC's FDI. The success of the original SEZ cities spurred the government to open 14 coastal cities to foreign investment in 1984 (Yeung and Hu, 1992) . This also began to attract additional foreign firms attempting to capitalize on the PRC's cheap labor and goods for lucrative overseas consumer markets.
During the late 1980s, however, many policy makers in the PRC felt that the country's entry into the world economy was proceeding too slowly. Some believed that the PRC's reform efforts were stagnating and meant to develop faster, yet they met resistance from conservative elements of the country who wished to maintain the status quo. Deng Xiao Ping's famous visit to the South in 1992 was intended to promote reform policies, and embolden those who wished to continue the PRC's move to capitalism. In the wake of Deng's visit, FTZs were established in several other coastal cities, including Shanghai's highly successful Putong Economic Zone. Smaller-scale economic and technological development zones were also opened throughout the country, with many zones being created in the country's interior.
These zones have generated some controversy, however. Several scholars have questioned the sustainability of SEZs due to a phenomenon known as "development zone fever": the opening of development zones beyond what is economically efficient or feasible, which results in a waste of resources and arable land (Wong and Tang 2005, Zhang 2011) . 2 Other scholars note that the preferential policy treatment accorded to the SEZs are largely responsible for the sustained rise of regional disparity in the PRC, particularly between the coastal provinces and the more Western provinces (Demurger et al. 2002 , Jones et al. 2003 . According to one observer, the inequalities between provinces in the PRC will lead to a rebellion "as long and as arduous a struggle as the Civil War in the United States" (Tyler 1995) .
B. Theoretical Predictions
In the wake of globalization, a rich theoretical literature has developed to explain the changes observed in both developed and developing countries. This section examines how it may guide the analysis of the experience of the PRC's SEZs. Trade theory that examines the expected impact of the PRC's entry into global markets often begin with the standard insight of the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, which predicts that countries will specialize in goods that require a resource-abundant input good. In the PRC, cheap unskilled labor is a relatively abundant resource and developed economies, such as the United States (US), have a greater supply of other resources, such as capital and high-skilled labor. As predicted by the H-O model, in the wake of the PRC's liberalized trade policy, the US data reflect a decline in employment in industries that employ workers who perform "routine" tasks, and a concurrent increase in imports in these industries (Ebenstein et al. 2009 ). Insofar as routine tasks can be performed easily by foreign workers, and are easily monitored by multinational parent corporations (Rossi-Hansberg and Grossman 2009), it is logical to assume that SEZs will attract industries that require large numbers of low-skilled production workers, thereby increasing demand for their services.
The model suggest that increased relative demand for low-skilled production workers in SEZs and other areas would raise the wages of unskilled Chinese workers, but lower the wages of their counterparts in developed countries. The implication is that wage inequality can be expected to rise in developed countries, but the prediction is more ambiguous for developing counties. Antras et al. (2006) present a model that predicts offshoring's impact on high-skilled workers in developing countries, such as Chinese managers who may be less talented than their foreign counterparts. They consider a one-sector, twocountry model in which large declines in communications costs enable the formation of North-South teams. They argue that the "globalization" equilibrium, wherein Northern workers can team up with Southern workers at no additional expense, will lead to international teams in which Northern managers supervise teams of Southern workers. Their model generates the prediction that inequality will rise in the North and in the South: "Globalization improves the quality of managers with whom Southern workers are matched, thus raising the productivity of these workers, and thereby leading to an increase in the return to skill. This effect is reinforced by an occupational choice effect: more agents become workers, hence increasing the range of abilities in the worker distribution." This prediction fits the PRC's SEZ experience, as its rural population left agriculture and entered into production jobs in the SEZs, potentially increasing the heterogeneity of skills among workers and contributing to Chinese wage inequality.
Another strand of literature has focused on firm productivity, and the potential for high-productivity multinational firms to create technology spillovers to domestic firms in these cities. The empirical evidence is mixed, however. Abraham et al. (2010) find evidence of positive spillovers, while Lin et al. (2009) fail to find evidence of any meaningful spillover in productivity. Hu and Jefferson (2002) report a negative effect on domestic firms examining the electronic industry, leaving no consensus. In a recent paper, Ito et al. (2010) examine the spillover effect on domestic firms in two areas: total factor productivity (TFP) and invention patent application. They find that spillovers are present both within and across different industries, but the spillovers operate differently. Domestic firms in direct competition with foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) located in close proximity to FIEs benefit from knowledge spillovers, whereas non-competing domestic firms benefit from the FIEs production spillovers. Du et al. (2011) also find positive productivity spillovers from FDI in both vertical and horizontal linkages with local firms. They find that vertical linkages grew stronger after the PRC's entry into the WTO, and that tariffs are associated with a negative effect on vertical and horizontal linkages.
Other scholars have focused on the role of trade in forcing the exit of less competitive firms. In an influential paper, Melitz (2003) posits that only the most productive firms will engage in multinational activity, and that trade can lead to welfare gains if lower-productivity firms are forced to exit the market. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that this claim is borne out by the data (Helpman et al. 2004 ). In combination with evidence that domestic firms in the PRC are of lower productivity than American firms through poor capital allocation (Hsieh and Klenow 2009) , it may be that the SEZs create an environment where domestic firms in the PRC are forced to either compete or exit the market. The ensuing data analysis will examine how SEZ status has affected the composition of firms, their productivity, and the wages of workers in these local labor markets.
III. DATA
The data on the timing and location of SEZs are the first attempt to catalogue these events systematically.
3 For each special zone, the year in which it was established, the special privileges associated with the zone, and the county in which it is located are recorded. The data cover six different types of zones: Special Economic Zones (SEZ), Free Trade Zones (FTZ), Coastal Open Cities (COC), Economic Technology Development Zone (ETDZ), Export Processing Zone (EPZ), and High Technology Development Zone (HTDZ). The principal focus is on the SEZs, FTZs, EPZs, and COCs as these provided much more substantial financial incentives to foreign multinational firms to enter the market. There was a proliferation of these special-status areas between 1985 and 1995, with a large number of special zones being established in the early 1990s after Deng Xiao Ping's visit to the South.
The firm data are taken from the 2003 Annual Survey of Industrial Production by the National Bureau of Statistics. The sample is composed of all nonstate firms with more than 5 million Yuan in revenue (about $800,000) plus all state-owned firms. The raw data consist of over 100,000 firms. Importantly, for each firm, both ownership type and year of establishment are observed. As shown in Figure 1 , foreign-firm entry rose precipitously in the early 1990s, following the expansion of SEZs and expanded incentives within existing zones. Summary statistics for the sample of firms are reported in Table 1 . Data on workers and their wages are drawn from the Urban Household Surveys (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . For each worker in the sample, age, sex, years of education, broad measures of industry and occupation, city, and monthly wage income are observed. The sample is restricted to those workers in the labor market: men aged 16-59 and women aged 16-55. Excluded from the sample are those who report being either retired or disabled. These data are matched by city to the sample of firms, and to the catalogue of SEZ status by county and year. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2 . The analysis of the causal effect of foreign entry on local labor markets is based on the assumption that SEZ status assignment induces higher-productivity firms to locate in these areas, and this is exogenous to the existing composition of workers in the city. As shown in Table  2 , the workers are quite similar in the two sets of cities-but workers in the SEZ cities are more likely to be working in a year X city cell with a zone in place. 
IV. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
A. Firm Entry and Average Productivity in Special Economic Zones
The proposed mechanism for workers to benefit from an economic zone is that foreign firms are more productive on average, and their presence will induce increases in average productivity, which may then lead to higher wages. Since special zones attract foreign firms and higher-productivity domestic firms, of interest are the reduced form relationship between SEZ status and labor productivity, as well as the mechanisms behind the relationship. As a prelude, it is demonstrated that FDI and domestic firms (DOM) are drawn to an SEZ in city j in year t, after accounting for city and year fixed effects. Models can be estimated by regressions of the following form:
Next, the relationship between average firm productivity and the status of the city as a special zone is determined. Since the adoption of an SEZ may lead to foreign firm entry which are on average more productive, it is anticipated that less productive firms will leave the market, and spillovers between foreign firms and domestic firms will lead to increased productivity as well. Labor productivity averages across firms by city and year are calculated; these are considered to be the primary mechanisms for an SEZ to attain better labor market outcomes. Note that since there is limited data on firms for the period by year, in the empirical results the firm data from 2003 is used to estimate analogues of (1) and (2), where the location and timing of the firm's establishment is used to assign zone status and estimate whether these policies attracted more productive firms.
The valued added per employee of all firms i already opened in city j is calculated as follows:
These data are then averaged among all firms opened by year t in city j. This allows calculation of labor productivity and estimation of the reduced form relationship between labor productivity in city j and year t, after accounting for year and city fixed effects. 4 4 In the empirical results, province fixed effects are included instead due to data constraints.
Note that in the empirical results, in the absence of complete firm data for all years, data are taken from 2003 and back-cast to approximate the city's firm composition using information on the year each firm was established. This is discussed further in the empirical results section.
B. Firm Profits and Worker Wages in Special Economic Zones
Multinational firms, relative to their domestic counterparts, are more capital-intensive and have higher productivity (Hsieh and Klenow 2009) . In combination with the tax advantages granted to these firms, their access to lowwage Chinese workers and high-price product markets in developed countries an increase the profits of firms in these cities can be anticipated. The extent to which workers share the benefits is an open empirical question. While standard microeconomic theory suggests that workers will earn their marginal revenue product, and that SEZ status will lead to higher wages, many fear that the surplus labor from rural areas will lead to firms holding an "upper hand" in wage bargaining. Of interest here are both the impact on corporate profits and the impact on workers' wages. Equations (4) and (5) estimate the reduced form relationship between firm profits, workers' wages, and SEZ status.
Since equation (2) can be thought of as a first-stage equation for equation (5), there is need to estimate models of the following form, where fitted values from equation (2) and controls for individual characteristics X are used.
C.
Returns to Skill, Wage Inequality, and Special Economic Zones
A voluminous theoretical literature on how foreign firm entry affects skill prices exists, but there is little real-world evidence. Here, models of the return to education within a city-year cell, and how it relates to conversion of a city to SEZ status are considered. To determine the impact on wage inequality, how individual-level wages are responsive to the presence of an SEZ, and whether these have led to increases in wage inequality, are examined. This includes impact of SEZ status on workers at the kth percentile of wages. An alternative strategy is to consider how skill prices themselves have changed, as proxied by years of education, in SEZ cities versus other cities. While the empirical analysis will only examine these issues in a descriptive manner, the models are presented for expository purposes.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Firm Entry
Table 3 estimates equations (1) and (2) to examine the link between firm entry and SEZs. Focusing on SEZs, FTZs, EPZs, COCs and a variable, which is a combination of the four different zones, a regression is run on a city's number of firm openings for each type of zone, with year and city fixed effects. The sample is the 345 distinct prefectures (or cities) for the period 1951-2002, yielding 17,940 observations (345 x 52). Columns 1-3 differentiate between foreign firm openings, domestic firm openings, and state-owned firm openings. The results show a positive and statistically significant relationship between all types of firm entry and a city's status as an SEZ. Interestingly, the different types of economic zones had different effects on the entry of firms. As shown in row 1 of Table 2 , the cities assigned to SEZ status had a strong impact on foreign firm openings (21.41) but a very small effect on domestic firm entry. As intended, these SEZ cities enabled foreign firms to produce goods in the PRC for export-but did not generate a large number of new domestic firms in these areas. In contrast, a city's assignment to FTZ status increased the number of foreign firm openings by 80.36 per year, and also resulted in an additional 53.44 new domestic private firms, and 36.27 state-owned firms. This is logical since FTZs were established to enable trading of intermediate goods between foreign and domestic firms. The results for EPZs and COCs are similar, with these areas generating a statistically significant number of new domestic and foreign firms.
These patterns are shown graphically in Figure 2 , which tracks the expansion of firms in the SEZs and all other cities. The zones were characterized by rapid increases in the number of foreign firms, followed shortly thereafter by increases in the number of domestic firms. In nonzone cities, domestic firm openings have been consistently higher than foreign firm openings. As will be shown in the next section, foreign firms are on average more productive, implying that these differences could generate differences in profits and wages across cities. Table 4 estimates modified versions of equations (3), (4), and (5) to examine the link between economic zones and several measures of economic performance of firms: total revenue, total employment, value added per worker, profit per worker, wages per worker. Ideally, the sample would include firms for the entire period , where the entry and exit of firms in SEZ cities relative to other cities is observed. Instead, in the absence of data for this period, the analysis focuses on a sample of manufacturing firms that are observed in 2003. While these data are limited, they allow for comparison of firms established in SEZs versus other cities.
B. Productivity, Profits, and Aggregate Wages
The results presented in Table 4 document significant productivity and pay differences between firms in SEZ cities, even controlling for a rich set of firm characteristics. The models are estimated with industry, province, and year fixed effects. Ideally, the models would include city fixed effects to control for timeinvariant differences between cities since there may be differences between cities that are chosen for zone assignment. However, since the sample is composed of only large manufacturing firms, and many cities such as Shenzhen only attracted large firms after they became an SEZ, it is infeasible to robustly estimate models with city fixed effects, and the results should be interpreted with this caveat. The sample is also stratified by whether the firm is domestic or foreign-owned so that it can be assessed whether zone status affected these firms differently. The results shown in Panel A indicate that foreign firms which entered SEZs are significantly more productive than foreign firms not in SEZs. Firms in SEZs are no larger than firms not in SEZs as measured by sales or employment, but firms in SEZs have significantly higher value added per worker, profit per worker, and wages per worker. The results indicate that being in an SEZ for foreign firms is associated with higher value added per worker of 6.24 percent, profits per worker of 13.4 percent, wages per worker of 16.2 percent, and all estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. However, it is worth noting that the share of firm revenue going to workers is no higher in the SEZs.
The results for domestic firms indicate that firms in SEZs have higher sales (6.31 percent) but are no larger as measured by employment. Like foreign firms, domestic firms in SEZs have higher value added per worker (5.54 percent) and pay higher wages per worker (18.82 percent), but are only modestly more profitable than firms in not in SEZs. This is consistent with claims that SEZs have contributed more to multinational profits than the profits of domestic Chinese firms. However, the data do indicate the policy's success at attracting productive and well-paying foreign and domestic firms. Note however, that these large manufacturing firms generally pay higher wages than smaller firms, and it is unclear from these results if workers in SEZ cities benefited in general, and whether real wages rose after accounting for the higher cost of living there. This is examined in detail in the next section. Figures 3 and 4 confirm graphically that firm productivity was higher in the economic zones (SEZs, FTZs, EPZs, COCs) than in other cities. As shown in Figure 3 , when firms are stratified by the year in which they were established and by foreign or domestic ownership, foreign firms are more productive than domestic firms, a difference persisting throughout the sample period. However, the figure does indicate that the productivity gap between the different types of firms is narrowing-which may indicate a technology spillover between foreign firms and domestic/state-owned firms. In light of the productivity difference between foreign versus domestic firms, Figure 4 presents differences in productivity between SEZs and other cities. Cities with SEZs experienced an average firm productivity increase from 60,000 yuan per worker in 1980 to 110,000 yuan per worker in 2003. Growth in productivity, however, was more sluggish in others cities, increasing from 50,000 yuan in 1980 to just 80,000 yuan per worker in 2003. These results suggest that a widening gap has emerged between firms in the zones versus other parts of the country. Whether this productivity improvement has induced an improvement in the real wage paid to workers is examined further. Table 5 estimates equations (4) and (5) to examine the link between average labor productivity and wages, with a focus on whether the productivity boost generated by SEZ status leads to higher wages. Both ordinary least squares and two stage least squares models are used to estimate these separately for all workers (column 1), manufacturing workers (column 2), and nonmanufacturing workers (column 3). All regressions include year fixed effects and province fixed effects.
C. Wage Effects and Responses to Inequality
5 A rich set of demographic controls including age, age squared, years of education, and sex, isolate the impact of firm composition in the city on the compensation of workers.
5 While ideally, city fixed effects are included, data on workers before and after the rollout of zones are insufficient to estimate stable models with city effects. The results should therefore be interpreted with caution, as city-specific factors that affect wages cannot be accounted for. As shown in Panel A, workers in SEZs are paid somewhat better than workers in other cities. These workers enjoy an 8-9% premium in real wages, but the difference is not statistically significant. An important and open research question is whether workers in SEZ cities are able to benefit from the presence of more efficient firms. Specifically, it is worth examining whether the presence of high value-added per worker firms leads to higher wages among workers in general. Unfortunately, data for the entire sample period that would reliably account for economic performance at the sub-national level are unavailable. Instead, the analysis relies on the 2003 firm survey and the distribution of years in which the firms opened. This enabled a back-cast generated distribution of firms by city in each year. This heroically assumes that firms operate at their 2003 levels, and no exit and entry. This as an attempt to analyze what types of firms entered cities before and after the SEZ assignment, and in the absence of data for the period, a potentially reasonable proxy for the composition of firms by city and year during the period. Upon examination of the relationship between wage rates and labor productivity, as proxied by value added per worker among the manufacturing firms in the sample, Panel B shows a robust relationship between wage rates and the log of average productivity among firms in the city, with a 1% increase in average productivity increasing real wage rates by 0.2%. This is statistically significant at the 1% level for manufacturing and nonmanufacturing workers, suggesting a spillover into other sectors of the economy. However, it is worth noting that this relationship may be endogenous. If workers who are more productive sort into cities with more productive firms, it may be that the causal link is more modest. Alternatively, if productivity is poorly measured relative to wages, it may be that the relationship is even stronger than the findings. Panel C and D examines the link between average firm productivity and wage rates exploiting the SEZ status of a city. Panel C reports the first-stage results, where a city's average productivity is regressed on its status as an SEZ. SEZ status increases productivity by 23.5% among firms, significant at the 5% level. Using the fitted values from this regression to examine the relationship between average productivity and real wages, workers are rewarded with 37% of the increase in average labor productivity, leaving 63% presumably to firms. However, these estimates are imprecise and statistically insignificant. While the results are not definitive, they suggest that workers have received, at most, one third of the increase in firm productivity in increased wages. In combination with evidence from firms that SEZ status is associated with increased firm productivity and firm profitability but is not associated with a higher share of revenue going to wages, it can be concluded that firms have not passed on the increased productivity to their workers. Poor bargaining power among workers due to large numbers of surplus labor in rural areas of the PRC has led to a situation in which economic expansion leads to more jobs but not necessarily better paying jobs within these cities in real terms. Figure 5 indicates that one mechanism for tepid growth in real wages in the SEZ areas was the rapid increase in prices. The figure indicates that from 1988 to 2001, the urban consumer price index rose from a level of 100 in 1985 to 350 by 2001, a stunning 250% increase. The price increase was slightly more modest in other cities, reaching 250 in 2001. The rapid increases in prices suggest that the workers and consumers were not able to enjoy fully the fruits of the PRC's expansion. In particular, if SEZs attract foreign firms, and this leads to higher prices but no increases in the real wage, the welfare impacts of these policies are ambiguous. This possibility is highlighted by Figure 6 , which indicates that among the sample of workers, little difference is observed in wage trends between SEZs and all other cities. From 1988 to 2001, the pace of increase of workers' wages has remained similar in the two groups, despite the productivity gap between firms in SEZs versus other cities. In addition, the figure suggests a dramatic increase in inequality for both SEZs and other cities. 7 In 1988, while the gap between the 90 th percentile and the 10 th percentile for real wages was less than 2000 yuan (in 1985 units), the difference in 2002 was nearly 10,000 yuan. If the PRC's economic boom is generating a windfall for firms but large increases in inequality, it is unclear whether the growth will generate welfare improvements for the majority of the population. The combination of rising inequality and anemic wage growth while corporate profits have surged is a potential recipe for unrest or at least dissatisfaction. This possibility is investigated in Table 6 . The results indicate that workers in SEZs are more likely to believe the city's income distribution is "very unfair." Workers in SEZ cities are 2.67 percentage points more likely to characterize the city as such, which is a 10% increase over a 30% sample mean (who report the city's wage distribution is very unfair). Almost no difference by gender is observed but a large gap by income and education is exhibited. A 10% increase in log wages is associated with a 6 percentage point decline in the probability of perceiving the wage distribution as unfair, or a 20% decline. The table also indicates that the SEZ status of a city is associated with the belief that the wage distribution is unfair only among those with less than a high school degree. Being young (under 40) and having more education are both negatively correlated with the perception that a city's income distribution is unfair. This suggests that young and highly educated workers perceive a fair return to education, and are therefore less likely to feel that the city's income distribution is unfair. Figure 7 provides evidence in favor of this hypothesis. The figure indicates rapid increases in the returns to education in the PRC, with the return rising from 3% to 4% in 1988 to almost 14% in 2001. These trends are similar, however, in both SEZs and all other cities. While it is not possible to identify noticeable gaps in the return to education in the two areas, it may be that the PRC's foreign firms have generated an increase in the return to skill, but the effect is felt across the PRC rather than in a specific set of labor markets. This topic could be an area for future work, though it is clear that rapid increases in skill prices in combination with rising price levels could have important welfare implications and lead to declining purchasing power among the PRC's least skilled workers. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper examined the impact on both firms and workers of assigning a city special economic zone status. While these areas have been hailed as a model for other Asian countries looking to capitalize on globalization and access to foreign markets, the Chinese experiment proves there are both winners and losers. Foreign multinationals raise employment levels in manufacturing, and both foreign and domestic firms in these cities experience rising productivity as well as rising profitability. However, the record is more modest with regard to generating high-paying jobs for workers. No evidence is found that average wage rates have increased in SEZs relative to other cities, in spite of large increases in average productivity of firms in these areas. In fact, since the zones have been characterized by rising prices, the welfare implications for residents of these cities are ambiguous. While SEZs have provided the opportunity for millions of rural workers to find urban employment, these areas have not yet experienced real wage growth.
As the PRC's economy matures, it stands to reason that workers will increase their bargaining power, and that increases in productivity will induce real wage increases. In the short run, however, policy makers should consider Returns to Education in Special Economic Zones
Returns to Education in Other Cities measures that prevent workers from poor rural areas having a "race to the bottom", where firms can pay individuals subsistence wages and capture the lion's share of the benefits to trade. Inequality within the PRC's cities is also a potential trigger for social unrest. Recent riots by low-wage workers suggest that the status quo is problematic, as workers complain of unscrupulous managers and corrupt local officials. 8 Future policy should be designed with the strategy of promoting growth but also providing a framework for establishing standards of worker compensation and protection that will generate robust growth and a fairer distribution of the benefits of trade. 
